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Theoretical Beings in the Limit of Truth




Can a theoretical being be described with a truthful term?

The question of whether a seemingly created being can be described with truthful terms is a philosophical maze that has puzzled people for centuries. The idea of a being that has no basis in reality raises important questions about the nature of truth, the understanding of reality, and the limits of human knowledge.

In this post, I will explore this question, using various philosophical arguments to shed light on this fascinating topic. I will consider whether it is possible to make truthful statements about these beings, and whether such statements have any meaning.



The nature of theoretical concepts

These are concepts that appear to exist solely in the imagination. They have no objective existence in the physical world, and therefore cannot be observed or measured. While these concepts may have some basis in reality (such as math), they are largely the product of human creativity and imagination.


If theoretical beings do not exist objectively in the world, then how can we know anything true about them? Can we even make claims about the properties and characteristics of these beings without any empirical evidence to support them?



Truth and theoretical beings


Truth is a complex concept, and philosophers have debated it for centuries. One common definition of truth is that it corresponds to reality (correspondence theory of truth). That is, a statement is true if it accurately describes a fact about the physical world or relates to it. However, this definition is not always applicable when it comes to theoretical beings. Theoretical beings, by definition, do not exist in "reality", and hence any statement about them cannot be said to correspond to reality.


So another way of defining truth is by coherence. A statement is true if it is consistent with other statements that are known to be true. The coherence theory of truth emphasizes the importance of the relationships between different statements, rather than focusing on the correspondence between statements and reality. This means that truth is not necessarily determined by whether a statement accurately describes the world, but rather by how well it fits in with other statements that are already accepted as true.

However, the coherence theory of truth has been criticizsed for its potential circularity. If truth is determined by coherence with other accepted beliefs, then how are those beliefs themselves established as true?

This fact to me leaves space for more theoretical truths, so this definition is more applicable when it comes to "imagined" beings. When it comes to these theoretical beings, the coherence theory of truth suggests that we can make meaningful claims about them by constructing "coherent systems of beliefs" or stories that include them. For example, we might say that dragons are fierce and fire-breathing creatures that hoard treasure. These features are consistent with other beliefs or stories about dragons in literature and mythology, thus making them a coherent truth. By constructing a "coherent system of beliefs" about dragons, we can say meaningful things about them, even though they do not exist objectively in the world.



One Horn or Two Horns:


When we imagine a Unicorn, we usually think of it with a single horn on its head. However, if one were to imagine a Unicorn with two horns instead of one, is it true to say that this Unicorn that has two horns does not exist? The answer to this question depends on how we understand the truth of our language, and our use of truth.


If we understand truth as a correspondence between our descriptions and reality, then it would not be true to say that a Unicorn has two horns. Because there is no real Unicorn with even one horn. But let us imagine that a different culture were to use their own language to call the Oryx (a real two horned creature) a Unicorn; would it then exist? In this way, language, description, and truth are not necessarily connected.


However, if we understand truth as a coherence between our descriptions and our beliefs, then it would be true to say that a Unicorn has two horns for those who believe that a Unicorn can have two horns. Regardless of the name people give it.

In terms of etymology, the fact that the word "Unicorn" has historically referred to a creature with one horn does not necessarily mean that it cannot refer to a creature with two horns in any instance. The sounds we use for language ultimately has no meaning, and so the “meanings” of words can shift. This raises even further questions about the relationship between language and reality, and how we can use language to talk about things that do not exist in the physical world.


From a pragmatic theory of truth point of view, the truth of a statement is determined by its practical consequences and its usefulness in guiding our actions and experiences. In the case of a Unicorn with two horns, the truth of the statement depends on how it is used in our interactions with the world. Since the word "Unicorn" has no real use, unlike words such as "one" and "two," there is no inherent truth in the statement. The statement only becomes true if we have a useful and practical reason to give truth to the existence of a "Unicorn with two horns". In my mind however, this creates a paradox, where the usefulness of the statement could be found in the context of this blog itself.

(I may have been wrong there, that one is confusing.)


Using the example above on the coherent theory of truth, we can see that this concept of truth is also relevant to religious beliefs about unseen beings and stories. If a religious text were to describe Unicorns as having one horn, then it would be considered a coherent truth within the context of that religion. However, if a different religious text described Unicorns as having two horns, then would that be considered false within the context of truth? I strongly argue no.

In this way, truth is not just about correspondence with reality, but the truthfulness of these descriptions depends on the coherence of the belief system of an individual, not even a group.

My yellow is not your yellow.


Ultimately, we should be aware of the limitations of language when describing unproven beings and acknowledge that our descriptions may be shaped by our own imagination and cultural context. Therefore, we must be careful when using language to describe unproven beings and recognize the limitations of such descriptions.




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